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1 Introduction
Pirate products are largely condemned as they threaten the institution of property
rights, are typically traded in shadow markets with tax avoidance and nurture
the deterioration of social norms. The current paper scrutinizes this normative
proposition. Pirate products typically challenge product brands with a dominating
market position which persists even when the sunk cost of development has been
recouped.1 They therefore intensify competition and lead to increased consumer
surplus making products available for low income consumers. Welfare losses result
from the tax evasion and deterioration of social norms making law abidance a
more scarce commodity. The welfare gains may, however, outweigh the welfare
losses. Our paper asks: when? Such a question is particularly relevant when the
government is viewed as a predatory revenue maximizer.
The existing industrial organization models on piracy have been surveyed by
Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006), including indirect appropriation, network effects and
informational asymmetries. Our approach is somewhat different. It highlights the
tax effects and public finance aspects of piracy and is more rooted in the literature
on shadow markets in general. Thereby, it is also linked to the analysis of social
norms in human behavior. The earlier work along those lines has provided only
limited analyses of the welfare implications of those activities. Therefore, our
paper asks in particular, whether pirate products traded in the shadow markets
are completely bad or whether they also provide welfare gains.2
Societies operate on implicit social contracts, characterized by norms. Yet, as
some markets are prone to develop shadow activities, the inherited social norms
become eroded. With the expansion of shadow markets, the prices in the legal
sector, however, tend to decline. Yet, people also care what other people think
of them.3 They also build self-esteem. A natural way of justifying the social
disapproval is to trace it to the fiscal free-riding. With market behavior shaped
by moral norms, legal firms, however, can price the self-esteem of honest people.
From the opposite perspective, a consumer in the legal market has the option of
switching the illegal market whereby honest consumers can obtain surplus over the
1Copies of modern brand products like Nike or Adidas in sportswear and shoes are actively
marketed as pirate products. With the high legal prices of CDs, people copy and illegally dis-
tribute music in internet.
2Illegal transactions go a long way to explaining why people hold cash despite the fact that
more efficient electronic payment systems exist. Cash payments are convenient for those who
seek to hide their motives. Markets for prostitution, for example, are predominantly based on
the use of cash. Moreover, the rise of terrorism is largely financed by illegal money. Cf. Kahn,
McAndrews and Roberds (2005). In a celebrated recent movie, Stranger than Fiction by Marc
Forster, a baker (Maggie Gyllenhaal) explains to the tax auditor (Will Ferrell) that she has paid
only 2/3 of her tax liability because she does not want to support certain governmental activities,
including military expenses.
3Fershtman and Weiss (1998).
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price charged by the legal producers.4
We report a number of results. We first show how taxation and the expected
cost of punishment shape the industry equilibrium. The social disapproval effect,
however, tends to be diluted as the shadow economy expands, providing a further
boost to shadow markets. Though shadow markets are not completely bad, the
paper suggests that the market solution can hardly lead to an optimal shadow
economy. This view arises from the two externalities identified, the fiscal exter-
nality and the erosion of social norms. We also show that the Laffer curve has a
unique maximum; moreover, countries with different social norms have different
revenue maximizing tax rates. We show that shadow activities may be justified in
face of exploitation of tax revenue by a Leviathan government. The model has im-
plications for monetary economics: social norms, tax rates and illegal transactions
are relevant to the demand for money.
The road map of our paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews briefly the previous
work on norms and shadow markets. Section 3 introduces the model and in Section
4, we consider the Laffer curve arising from revenue maximizing tax policies with
the presence of shadow markets and morality. Section 5 presents the welfare results
and Section 6 some implications.
2 Previous Studies on Norms and Shadow Mar-
kets?
The sociological literature on moral norms goes back to Macaulay (1963) who
suggests that social pressure and reputation are more widely used than formal
contracts or filing suits. People behave honestly because honesty is rewarded and
defection punished in future transactions. In Baldry’s view (1987), moral feelings
have to be incorporated in the theory of tax evasion. According to Kandori (1992),
social norms work to support efficient outcomes in infrequent transactions where
agents change their trading partners over time. Falkinger (1995) notes that per-
ceived fairness and equity of the political and economic system increases the bad
conscience of evaders. Fortin et al. (2004) find that perceived unfair taxation may
lead to increased tax evasion. Myles and Naylor (1996) investigate a tax evasion
model where a social custom utility is derived when taxes are paid honestly and
there is a conformity payoff from adhering to the standard pattern of social be-
havior. The ideas of reputation and disobedience in the utility function go back
at least to Akerlof (1980) whose paper examines adherence to social customs. The
4Our model highlights the conflict between opportunistic private incentives and collective
values. Some studies in sociological literature explain crimes as the outcome of evolutionary
interplay between productive and expropriative strategies, cf. Cohen and Machalek (1988) and
Vila and Cohen (1993).
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econometric results of Orvaska and Hudson (2002) using survey data suggest that
evasion is condemned by a large proportion of the population. Their empirical
analysis on interaction between tax evasion and social stigma, probability of being
caught, law obedience, and moral attitudes to tax evasion supports the importance
of both civic duty and law obedience in deterring tax evasion.
Acemoglu (1995) introduces a model of the allocation of talent between pro-
ductive and unproductive activities. Rent-seeking, tax fraud, corruption and crime
create a negative externality on productive agents. The non-pecuniary aspects of
the reward structure consist of social status and the prestige. New generations
learn from established norms and role models. People adjust their behavior to a
particular reference group. Thus social status may depend on choices that the rest
of society makes and ’bad behavior’ may have a less damaging stigma when it is
more widespread.
The determinants and effects of the informal sector are studied by Loayza
(1996). Using data on Latin American countries, it is found that the informal
sector negatively affects growth and its size depends on the tax burden. Johnson
et al. (1997) consider the allocation of labor between the official and unofficial
sectors and the implications of this for tax revenue, law and order and efficiency.
Friedman et al. (2000) use various data sets on Eastern Europe, the Former
Soviet Union, the OECD and Latin America, and suggest that the incentive to go
underground to dodge higher tax rates is outweighed by the benefits of remaining
official. According to Giles (1999) and Thomas (1999), growth in the underground
economy is associated with increases in the actual or perceived tax burden but also
with the degree of economic regulation. Schneider (2000) expresses the concern
that with a growing (or substantial) shadow economy, policy may be based on
mistaken official indicators. Giles and Caragata (1999) are concerned that unpaid
tax in the hidden economy creates a deadweight loss on the economy. These will, in
turn, undermine taxation equity by shifting the tax burden toward honest, socially
responsible individuals and corporations. Davidson, Martin and Wilson (2003)
suggest that shadow transactions may increase welfare. By allowing agents to self-
select into the black market, the government can target tax breaks to transactions
involving low-quality goods.
3 Model
3.1 Consumers’ Limited Loyalty to Social Norms
Consider a market with an existing product brand. The product is assumed to
have prestige value, contributing to people’s basic willingness to pay for it. The
producer has market power in pricing and the cost of development by the brand
developer is assumed fully recouped in the past. In such a market, the entry cost
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for a legal entrant is non-trivial because of the nature of the product or because
of barriers to entry.5 The product is subject to a commodity (sales) tax, τ > 0.
The pricing power and the tax wedge in the consumer price, create an incentive
for illegal production. To minimize the risk of social punishment, consumers visit
the illegal market anonymously.6 Although we explicitly introduce the commodity
tax only, our model can be interpreted as also including the social security taxes.7
Our model is a version of the seminal vertical product differentiation model
introduced by Mussa and Rosen (1978). There is a continuum of consumers with
a mass of one. At most, they buy one private product, either a legal or an illegal
one. Consumers differ in respect of their willingness to pay for the product brand.
We denote consumers visiting the legal market by k, and those visiting the illegal
market by j. We denote producer prices by pl, pi. Thus, consumer prices are (1+τ)pl
and pi. Consumers value both private and public goods which are complementary.
8
Complementarity is introduced by making the willingness to pay for the private
good increase in proportion to the amount of public goods in the economy, g.9
The marginal utility from buying a private product is thus grh for consumer h,
where rh (h = k, j), denoting the consumer-specific willingness to pay, assumed
to be uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. Each consumer takes g as given. Non-
excludability implies that both honest and dishonest consumers derive utility from
public goods though the latter free-ride in the financing of them.
We introduce explicitly two mechanisms to control illegal transactions, social
norms and the cost of holding cash. Consumers have preferences in terms of goods
and social approval. 10 They also have a subjective preference for their self-esteem.
Self-esteem effect is measured by s > 0 and it is uniform across people. The total
marginal utility to consumers in buying a legal product is grk+ s and is uniformly
distributed over [s, g+ s]. If caught, deviants suffer from a social disapproval cost,
5The natural entry barrier in the legal sector arises from protected trade marks. Such a barrier
does not exist in the illegal sector.
6Punishment may also be a legal suit but we focus on social norms. By illegal production,
we mean an activity that sets out to rival legal activity. If only for simplicity, we exclude the
possibility that the legal firm operates partly like an illegal producer in the shadow economy.
7Assume that production technology is linear, i.e. one unit of labor hour is needed to produce
one unit of output. When the legal firm pays social security tax on labor input while the illegal
firm does not, this differentiates the labor cost.
8It is common to assume complementarity between public and private goods in public finance
literature. For an early and a recent reference, see Ellickson (1973) and Lim (2003).
9We consider consumers who buy at most one good. Therefore we work with net utility
functions, introduced by Katz and Shapiro (1985). With direct utility, say U = xg, where x is
the amount of private goods, the demand (hence the willingness to pay) for the private good x
positively depends on the amount of public goods.
10The subjective status effect is well-known in psychology, cf. Singh-Manoux et al. (2003). In
economics, Fershtman et al. (2001) have studied status effects.
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z > 0. This disapproval is expressed by those who adhere to the social norm.11 In
terms of consumer valuation, the legal product is thus valued at grk + s while the
illegal product is valued at grk − xlzξ, where ξ is the probability of being caught.
Payments in the illegal market are made by cash. More efficient means of
payment dominate in the legal market. The cost differential is denoted by γ > 0. It
is possible to interpret the model both as the cash-in-advance variety with (1 + γ) pi
measuring the amount of cash demanded, and the money-in-the-utility variety.
We denote the net utility of a non-deviant and deviant by uk and by vj,
uk = grk + s− (1 + τ) pl, v
j = grj − xlzξ − (1 + γ) pi. (1)
Moral (honest) and immoral (dishonest) behavior is endogenously determined.
Morality as social capital is determined by the moral network.12 The social disap-
proval effect, z, is taken to be constant.13
3.2 Homo Oeconomicus
It is helpful to first consider the simplified version of the model where consumers’
type is a pure Homo Oeconomicus and where they do not care about morality or the
moral network. Consumers visiting the illegal market are caught with probability
ξ > 0 and are subject to the penalty, z > 0. The net utilities are
uk = grk − (1 + τ ) pl, v
j = grj − zξ − pi.
We first show that in an industry equilibrium (see Appendix B), there will be
segmentation of markets as follows,
Lemma 1 Those consumers with a high marginal utility rk will buy the legal prod-
uct while those with lower marginal utility buy the illegal product.
11Our approach is a formalization of the sociological theory of self-esteem. Cf. Franks and
Marolla (1976) who conceptualize self-esteem in terms of the individual’s feelings derived from
his own perceptions and appraisals of significant others in the form of social approval.
12People thus adjust their behavior, comparing themselves with a particular reference group
(Acemoglu (1995)). An alternative way to think of moral punishment is to include also those
who were in fact dishonest but were not caught. Such a formulation of hypocritical behavior
would complicate the model without offering additional insights. We also think that it is more
natural for non-detected violators to regard violators as their reference group. Deviants may well
value other deviants positively, like members of gangs in sub-cultures.
13Alternatively, one could study a slightly different version of our model. Suppose that the
private cost of disapproval, say zk, is distributed across agents on support (0, 1) instead of being
constant. Reordering agents in declining order according to rk − xlz
kξ, one can carry out the
analysis in a similar way as we do. The stigma effect has previously been discussed in psychology
by Puhl and Brownell (2003) and Schulze and Angermeyer (2003), for example.
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Proof. Denote marginal consumers as (m,n) where m is indifferent between
buying the legal and illegal product while n is indifferent between buying the illegal
product and buying none. Thus the marginal utility for any consumer, k, buying
the legal product is g(1− k). The marginal utility for j buying the illicit product
is g(1 − j) − ξz. Insert k = j = m to obtain the expressions for the marginal
consumer. For indifference, g(1−m)− (1 + τ)pl = g(1−m)− ξz − pi. Therefore,
the consumer price in the legal sector has to exceed the price in the illegal sector,
(1 + τ )pl > pi. Note that the market share of legal production must be xl = m.
If industry equilibrium is characterized by the coexistence of the legal and illegal
sectors (we derive the conditions for coexistence below), consumers k with greater
willingness to pay than the marginal consumer m satisfy k < m. Therefore it holds
that their net utility from the legal product exceeds that of the illegal product,
g(1 − k) − (1 + τ)pl > g(1 − m) − ξz − pi. This establishes that they buy the
legal product. Similarly, the buyers of the illegal product, j, are located within
m < j < n. The third group buys none.
Now that we have a downward-sloping demand curve, cutting the vertical axis
at g (as the maximal rk equals one), and the horizontal axis at one (because the
mass of consumers equals one), we obtain from this triangle g−r
m
xl
= g. Solving
then for the expression for the willingness to pay by the marginal consumer of
the legal product yields rm = (1− xl) g. To solve for the marginal willingness to
pay for the illegal product, we note that g−r
n
xi+xl
= g, yielding rn = (1− xi − xl) g.
Clearly, rm > rn. This implies that rm − (1 + τ)pl > 0. By implication, the legal
firm cannot exploit the full consumer surplus from its customers. Legal consumers
have the option to visit the illegal market. The illegal producer, in contrast, is
able to exploit the full surplus from its marginal customer.
We now show
Proposition 2 There is a critical level of the commodity tax rate, τ , which, when
exceeded, invites the birth of the shadow economy. Moreover, there is a critical
level of the commodity tax rate, τ , at which the legal production dies out. The
critical values are given by τ = −g+2(zξ+ci)−cl
cl
, τ = g+zξ+ci−2cl
2cl
. For τ < τ < τ, legal
and shadow economies coexist.
Proof. Solve the price differential (1 + τ )pl − pi = ξz. What this condition
suggests is that the consumer is indifferent between visiting the legal and illegal
market if the risk of getting caught and penalized is fully compensated. For the
marginal consumer n, the net utility from buying the illegal product is zero, g(1−
n) − ξz − pi = 0. Noting that n is the last buyer, i.e. n = xl + xi; her net
utility is (1 − xl − xi)g − ξz − pi = 0. Total production and prices thus satisfy
xl + xi = 1 −
ξz+pi
g
, pi = (1 − xl − xi)g − zξ, pl =
(1−xl−xi)g
1+τ
. Consumers buy
the product with greater net utility. Under Cournot competition between the
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producers, outputs are determined from14
max
xl
(pl − cl)xl, max
xi
( pi − ci)xi, (2)
where cl, ci > 0 are the production costs. The producer prices can be solved as
pl =
g + zξ + ci + (1 + τ)cl
3 (1 + τ)
, pi =
g + (1 + τ)cl − 2zξ + ci
3
(3)
and the market shares satisfy
xl =
g + zξ + ci − 2(1 + τ )cl
3g
, xi =
g + (1 + τ)cl − 2zξ − 2ci
3g
. (4)
The claims concerning the critical tax rates τ and τ follow from conditions
xi > 0 and xl > 0.
If the commodity tax rate is thus too high or if the legal cost of production,
cl, is high, say because of high social security charges, the legal sector does not
exist. The high cost of punishment or the high cost of production in illegal activity,
zξ + ci, supports the survival of the legal sector.
Discussion Suppose for a moment that there is only one producer, a monopoly
with a zero production cost. It can be shown that its output is g/2. The illegal
producer has an incentive to enter if the tax rate exceeds τ . Suppose it faces some
set-up cost, say co, in organizing its market but is also able to produce at zero cost.
It has an incentive to enter the market if the set-up cost satisfies co <
1
2
(g − 2zξ) .
Let co =
1
2
(g − 2zξ) − ε, where ε > 0. Given the demand functions, it is able to
sell xi = 2ε/3g. Solving for the shadow market price, pi =
1
2
(g − 2zξ) − ε
3
, we
thus have that 2ε/3g turncoats buy the illegal product. Those are, however, not
remorseless; they just represent homo oeconomicus.
Our next question is whether moral norms can help to control the market share
of illegal production. Then we ask whether such a morally based control is socially
desirable.
3.3 Homo Moralis
With social norms introduced, the price effects are non-trivial. These result from
the fact that the self-esteem and social disapproval effects tend to be priced not
only in the illegal product, they also spill over to the legal market. We show
14The firm producing in the legal market obviously has an incentive to capture consumers in
the illegal market, too. An example is the production of pirate cigarettes. The legal firm typically
issues licenses to combat illegal production.
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Proposition 3 The net surplus of the marginal consumer in the legal market is
reduced by his self-esteem. The same holds when deviants are subject to social
disapproval.
Proof. Denote again the marginal consumers by (m,n), where m is indifferent
between buying the legal and illegal product while n is indifferent between buying
the illegal product and buying none. Thus the marginal utility to any consumer,
say k, buying the legal product is g(1− k). Then the marginal utility to j buying
the illegal product is g(1− j)− ξzxl. For the marginal consumer, his net marginal
utilities have to be equal:
g(1−m) + s− (1 + τ)pl = g(1−m)− ξzxl − (1 + γ)pi.
The price differential now satisfies (1 + τ )pl − (1 + γ)pi = s + ξzxl. Thus both,
the self-esteem effect and the group effect of moral disapproval, are reflected in the
price differential, as the legal producer can exploit them. For marginal consumer n,
the net utility in buying the illegal product is zero, (1−n)g− ξzxl− (1+γ)pi = 0.
Noting that n is the last buyer, i.e. n = xl + xi, his net utility is (1− xl − xi)g −
ξzxl− (1 + γ)pi = 0. Total production thus satisfies xl+ xi = g− ξzxl − (1 + γ)pi.
Solving for the prices,
pi =
(1− xl − xi)g − xlzξ
(1 + γ)
, pl =
(1− xl − xi) g + s
(1 + τ)
.
Given the reaction functions,
xl =
(1− xi) g + s− (1 + τ ) cl
2g
, xi =
g − (g + zξ) xl − (1 + γ) ci
2g
,
we can solve for Cournot-Nash equilibrium
xl =
2s+ g + (1 + γ) ci − 2 (1 + τ) cl
3g − zξ
(5)
xi =
(g − zξ) g − 2g (1 + γ) ci − (g + zξ) (s− (1 + τ ) cl)
(3g − zξ) g
(6)
pl =
(g + 2s+ (1 + γ) ci) g + (g − zξ) (1 + τ ) cl
(3g − zξ) (1 + τ )
(7)
pi =
(g − zξ) (g + (1 + γ) ci)− (g + zξ) (s− (1 + τ ) cl)
(3g − zξ) (1 + γ)
. (8)
Insert the expressions for quantity and price above into the surplus of the marginal
consumer,
csm = g(1−m) + s− (1 + τ )pl
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and note that m = xl. Then develop the partial derivative in respect of s, obtaining
∂csm/∂s < 0, i.e. the net surplus of the marginal consumer in the legal market is
lower when he is subject to self-esteem. The same holds when deviants are subject
to social disapproval, ∂csm/∂z < 0. This suggests that as consumers become more
moral, they pay a price in terms of reduced surplus.
Comparative static analysis (subject to the condition g − ξz > 0 i.e. that
the expected cost of punishment cannot be greater than the maximal willingness
to pay) shows the potentially powerful effects of self-esteem and the risk of being
caught when deviating. Those effects tend to keep the legal sector large. Evaluat-
ing, ∂xl/∂s =
2
3g−zξ
> 0. Self-esteem thus operates like an individual’s conscience,
supporting legal production. The mechanism whereby the social punishment effect
depends on the size of the legal sector is confirmed by the result ∂xl/∂z =
ξxl
3g−zξ
.
The marginal consumer retains the option of returning to the shadow market.
It is easy to see that the greater the shadow market is, the more valuable this
option will be. The pricing of the shadow market producer, however, reduces the
value of this option.
Cost of holding money. The cost of holding money operates very much like
a commodity tax in our model. To see this, solve for the profits of the legal and
illegal producer,
(pl − cl)xl =
g
(1 + τ)
(xl)
2 , (pi − ci) xi =
g
(1 + γ)
(xi)
2 .
Thus, the cost of holding cash has a systematic negative impact on the profits
of the illegal producer.
4 Leviathan Government and Laffer Curve
Proponents of the view of governments as revenue-maximizing Leviathans, which
use resources inefficiently, would presumably welcome the shadow economy.15 Sup-
pose that the tax revenue, T, is only partly allocated to public goods and that the
government is able to extract a fraction, say 0 < y < 1, for its own use. Then the
tax revenue available for financing public goods are
g = (1− y)T.
15Wastage of tax revenue may result, for example, from influence or bribes by powerful lobbies,
leading to inefficient public spending. Grossman (2002) shows that if the technology of predation
is sufficiently effective in a society, then having a "king" is better for everyone even though the
king maximizes the consumption of a ruling elite.
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Assume that the government sets a tax rate τ to maximize its revenue, T =
τplxl. Maximizing (1−y)T is equivalent to maximizing T. Inserting the legal price
and quantity yields
T (τ , s, z, ξ) =
τ
(1 + τ ) (3g − zξ)2
P (τ), (9)
where P (τ ) =
((g + 2s+ (1 + γ) ci) g + (g − zξ) (1 + τ) cl) (2s+ g + (1 + γ) ci − 2 (1 + τ ) cl) .
The self-esteem and social disapproval effects thus interfere with the Leviathan
government’s ability to raise tax revenue. The revenue T (τ , s, z, ξ) is a product of
two terms. It is zero when any of those terms is zero, non-zero otherwise. The
first of those terms is τ
(1+τ)(3g−zξ)2
which is zero when the tax rate is zero. The
second one P (τ ) is a polynomial of second degree in the tax rate. It has two roots.
Recalling that g − zξ > 0, the coefficient of τ2 is −2 (g − zξ) (cl)
2 < 0, making
P (τ ) a downward-sloping parable with two real roots. Thus the three roots of
T (τ , s, z, ξ) = 0 are
τ 1 = 0
τ 2 = −
(g + 2s+ (1 + γ) ci) g + cl (g − zξ)
cl (g − zξ)
< 0 (10)
τ 3 =
2s+ g + (1 + γ)ci − 2cl
2cl
> 0
The positivity of τ3 follows from the fact that g + 2s − 2cl + ci (γ + 1) is greater
than the numerator of xl, which has been recognized to be positive.
Excluding the negative tax rate, we first prove
Lemma 4 At low (but positive) tax rates, tax revenue (Laffer curve) is increasing
in the tax rate.
Proof. Evaluating the slope of the tax revenue function at origin, (∂T/∂τ)τ=0 =
plxl+τ [xl(∂pl/∂τ )+pl(∂xl/∂τ )]. With an active legal market, plxl > 0. With τ = 0,
the last term is zero. The result follows by continuity.
We also prove that
Lemma 5 The legal sector disappears at tax rate τ3.
Proof. Inserting τ3 into the expression for xl, yields xl = 0.
Therefore,
Proposition 6 A Laffer curve exists and has a unique maximum.
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Proof. It follows from the Lemmas 4 and 5 that there is a unique tax rate,
say 0 < τ ∗ < τ3, at which tax revenue is at its global maximum.
The Laffer curve is presented in Figure 1, say for two countries A and B.
We note from above that the revenue maximizing tax rate τ∗ is close to τ3/2
but marginally below it because the revenue τ
(1+τ)(3g−zξ)2
P (τ ) is not a perfectly
symmetric parable. As τ 3 positively depends on public goods, self-esteem, the cost
of legal production, the cost of holding money and negatively on the cost of legal
production, so presumably does the tax rate τ ∗.
The intuition suggests that having an untaxed sector reduces the resources
which a Leviathan government can extract. This intuition can be confirmed by
noting that ∂τ3/∂s < 0. Whether this is socially desirable, however, depends on
the extent to which people value public goods. Moreover, when social norms are
important, consumers do not necessarily switch from the taxed to the untaxed
sector, relaxing the effective constraint on revenue-maximizing behavior.
Figure 1: Laffer curves for countries A and B
The analysis of the Laffer curve has implications for how shadow economies
develop in cross-country comparison and how that is affected by social norms.
Consider two countries, A and B, where A is more strictly adhering to social
norms, sA > sB. This means that the Laffer curve of country A is located to
the right of that of country B in Figure 1. Moreover, the revenue maximizing
tax rate is greater (thereby its tax revenue) in country A than in country B.
Therefore, countries planning to collect maximal tax revenue, should abstain from
international tax harmonization if their social norms differ.
5 Welfare
Redistribution of the tax burden between honest and dishonest consumers rep-
resents fiscal externality. Honest consumers remain the sole contributors to the
production of public goods. This tends to lead to a social disapproval effect, an-
alyzed above. Moreover, as reduced total tax revenue limits the supply of public
11
goods, it reduces the well-being of all consumers, both tax-payers and free-riders.
Apart from the fiscal externality, there is, nonetheless, a welfare gain to the ex-
tent that the legal producer faces more intensive competition. With strong pricing
power for a brand producer in the circumstances of rather inelastic demand, it can-
not be excluded that it may be the welfare gain which dominates. The availability
of untaxed products also tends to attract new buyers, resulting in a welfare gain.
Our model above thus left us with the conclusion that illegal products give
rise not only to welfare losses. They also give rise to welfare gains. There is
more to it. Once the government has selfish Leviathan motives for grasping the
tax revenue, such efforts need to be controlled. It is the shadow markets which
discipline government spending. Shadow markets might thus lead to further welfare
gains apart from their role in controlling monopoly profits.
To elaborate, the utilitarian view suggests exploring the maximal aggregated
consumer and producer surplus W = CSl + CSi + πl + πi subject to the relevant
constraints. Here CSl and CSi denote the after-tax expressions for the consumer
surplus and πl and πi stand for the profits. The utilitarian welfare maximum
satisfies maxxl,xi L =W+λlxl+λixi+µ[1−xl−xi], where λl ≥ 0, λi ≥ 0 and µ ≥ 0
are the relevant shadow prices. In an interior solution with 1−xl−xi > 0, λl = 0,
λi = 0 and µ = 0. One conclusion is clear form the outset: the solution to this
problem is likely to deviate from the market solution because of the externalities
involved.
To build an intuition, consider the case in the absence of social norms and
assume that the cost of production is nil, cl = ci = 0. It is then easy to see that
in market equilibrium, a commodity tax on the legal good operates like a lump-
sum tax, borne by the shareholders of the legal firm. The optimal allocation of
consumers into the legal and shadow economy would capture the idea that the
marginal utility of the last legal consumer would equal the marginal utility of the
first consumer in the shadow market. The cost of being caught and the tax rate
would be the decisive determinants of the optimal allocation.
With cl > 0, ci > 0, however, the desired allocation is different. The price of
the legal product has to be higher since the price in the shadow market cannot be
negative. With cl > 0, the commodity tax is not fully borne by the shareholders, it
becomes distortive and reduces the optimal production of the legal firm and hence
results in a welfare loss.
The size of the shadow economy is controlled if people are subject to moral
sentiments. However, the first-best cannot be attainable by the market solution
in this case either because of the externalities involved. To abstract for a moment
from budgetary effects, consider an economy with an inherited infrastructure, i.e.
assume a fixed supply of public goods, g = 1, financed by other taxes. With the
expressions for the consumer and producer surplus developed in Appendix A, the
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social first-order conditions for an interior second-best outcome are
xi = ϕo − ϕ1xl, xl = φ0 − φ1xi, (11)
where
ϕo =
1− (1 + γ) ci
1− γ
, ϕ1 =
(
(1 + zξ) (1 + τ)− τ (1 + γ)
(1 + τ ) (1− γ)
)
φ0 =
1 + s− (1 + τ ) cl
(1− τ )
, φ1 =
(
τ (γ + 1)− (1 + zξ) (1 + τ)
− (1− τ ) (γ + 1)
)
.
People’s values in terms of moral sentiments will interact with the desirability of
shadow markets. Should the shadow economy exist as part of the social optimum,
the self-esteem effect cannot be too strong. For the shadow economy to survive,
the cost of holding cash should not be inflated too much. For the legal sector to
survive, the tax rate should not be too high and the anticipated punishment zξ
should not be too small.
Government exploitation of tax revenue. Suppose as in the previous section
that the government is grasping fraction 0 < y < 1 from the tax revenue τplxl.
Then ask: does the Leviathan motive of the government provide a justification for
shadow transactions? Suppose thus that the government increases its waste, dy >
0. Given such an interest conflict between the citizens and those in power would
it be welfare-increasing to let the shadow economy expand? This question can be
analyzed as follows. Suppose a utilitarian "planner" moves the marginal consumer
m from the legal sector to the illegal one. What are the welfare consequences?
An increase in y reduces tax revenue and hence public spending. This causes
a welfare loss to all consumers. Our reasoning here does not hinge upon whether
the pre-existing market equilibrium was socially optimal or not. We ask, whether
the incentive of the "planner" to let the illegal market expand has increased or is it
reduced? A move of one (the marginal) consumer m leaves the market prices and
market shares (practically) unchanged, but causes a private gain to the marginal
consumer and private losses to the others. As he does not pay the tax, there is a
fiscal externality from reduced tax revenue on all other consumers because of the
fiscal externality involved. The social loss can be great relative to the private gain
of the marginal consumer. The intuition suggests that this is the case when the
tax rate is high and/or when the government exploits only a small fraction of tax
revenue. If only for the sake of tractability, consider this problem without moral
aspects. As we consider a switch of one consumer from the legal to the illegal
market, the effects on market prices and market shares can be neglected. The
private gain to the new deviant is given by the price differential (1+τ )pl−pi = ξz.
In the previous equilibrium, his contribution to the tax revenue was τpl. The
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implied reduction in public spending is dg = (1− y)τpl. The welfare losses arising
from downward shifts in demand can be developed by resorting to Figure 2 (in
Appendix B) and are given by 1
2
xldg+
1
2
xi(xidg− zξ). Inserting dg, one can write
the net welfare loss,
dW = (1− y)τ −
zξ
1
2
xlpl +
1
2
x2i pl
. (12)
There are parameter combinations when dW < 0 and when dW > 0. In
particular, in case of a small social punishment z, a great tax rate τ or small
(initial) exploitation rate y makes the first term greater than the second term and
vice versa. Therefore,
Proposition 7 Expansion of the illegal market is justified in face of increased
exploitation of tax revenue of a Leviathan government when the tax rate is high,
the inherited level of the exploitation rate is small, and where the social punishment
of shadow transactions is small.
The reason one needs a small level of the exploitation rate y in this proposition,
is that the smaller y is, the greater is the adverse effect of the switch of the marginal
agent on the amount of public spending.
There is an interesting further finding in the case of an economy with a zero
production cost, cl = ci = 0. This is often the case with many high-tech digital
products. As we have stated, a commodity tax on the legal product operates like
a non-distorting income levy on the shareholders of the legal firm. For a maximal
supply of public goods, it is then actually socially optimal to maximize the tax
revenue available from the legal firms’ consumers. It falls on the firm’s owners.
Yet, even this result does not imply that a shadow economy should not exist. The
reason is that competition resulting from having the shadow market reduces the
legal price, resulting in a welfare gain. Thus in the case of products with a zero cost
of production, the social planner ought to behave like the Leviathan, maximizing
the tax revenue from legal consumers but should not necessarily eliminate the
shadow economy.
6 Final Remarks
The welfare gain of illegal markets arises from the legal firm not being able to
exploit the full consumer surplus. However, the mechanisms are manifold. When
people’s market behavior also reflects social norms, the legal firm can price the
self-esteem of honest people. On the other hand, buyers in the legal market have
the option of visiting the illegal market. Such an implicit blackmailing option
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causes them to earn a surplus over the price charged by the legal producer. Those
who visit the illegal market benefit from untaxed products though they subject
themselves to moral disapproval. The availability of untaxed products also tends
to attract new buyers, resulting in a welfare gain.
The present paper has implications for monetary economics, not to mention
monetary policy. Ever since Keynes (1936), work on monetary economics has
identified the various motives for why people hold cash. As the by-product, the
current paper raises the idea of an additional motive, the value of holding cash for
anonymous transactions in a shadow economy. Our theorizing leads to a number of
new testable implications, not yet analyzed in monetary economics. It is expected
that the demand for money depends both on illegal activities in the economy and
on the size of the shadow sectors, and on the social norms. In addition, it depends
on crime rates, the probability of being caught and the resulting punishment from
illegal activities. It also depends on the competitiveness and hence the excess
profits of the legal system and the general level of taxation, and on the industrial
structure, with industries prone to develop shadow transactions. This all tends to
make it harder to assess the real effects of monetary policy.
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A Welfare Measures
The expressions for the consumer surplus are
CSl =
1
2
g (1− rm)xl + (gr
m + s− (1 + τ )pl) =
(
1
2
xl + xi
)
xlg (A1)
CSi =
1
2
(grm − xlzξ − (1 + γ) pi)xi =
1
2
g (xi)
2 . (A2)
Thus, CSD =
1
2
g (xl + xi)
2 . Under a monopoly, the consumer surplus is CSM =
1
2
g (1− rm)xM =
1
2
g (xM)
2 . The welfare measures (with g = 1) with two producers
and one producer are given by
WD =
1
2
(xl + xi)
2 + (pl − cl)xl + (pi − ci)xi (A3)
WM = CSM + πM =
1
2
(xM)
2 + (pM − cM) xM , (A4)
where the prices can be inserted from the consumer indifference conditions. The
resulting output is xM = (cl − (s + 1) (1 + τ)
−1) / (1− 2(1 + τ)−1) = φ0.
B Market shares of legal and illegal producers in
duopoly equilibrium
Figure 2: Market shares of legal and illegal producers in duopoly equilibrium
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